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A dissociation can be made between memory for an
item and memory for its origin, or source (Johnson, Hash-
troudi, & Lindsay, 1993). For example, one might cor-
rectly remember that the African National Congress won
the first open South African election without remember-
ing if the information was acquired from television,
radio, newspaper, or a friend. Memory for source infor-
mation—often referred to as “source monitoring” (see,
e.g., Johnson et al., 1993)—is important in a variety of
situations and domains. This is most clearly demon-
strated by instances in which source memory fails, as in
telling a joke thought to be one’s own invention to the
person from whom one first heard it, or confusing the
memory of a crime event with information about the crime
that became available subsequently, such as whether or
not a weapon was present. 
Studies collecting data on both source and item memory
have yielded a consistent finding: item information is re-
membered better than source information (see, e.g.,
Batchelder & Riefer, 1990; Brown & Halliday, 1991; Voss,
Vesonder, Post, & Ney, 1987). The inferiority of source
memory is especially pronounced in older adults (e.g.,
Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chros-
niak, 1989; McIntyre & Craik, 1987) and patients with or-
ganic memory disorders (Schacter, Harbluk, & McLach-
lan, 1984; Shimamura & Squire, 1987), suggesting that the
ability to remember items and the ability to remember the
source of those items are dissociable processes. 
Although it is well established that item information is
remembered better than source information overall, the
rate at which the two types of information are forgotten
is less clear. Studies of source monitoring that investigate
the rate of forgetting vary widely in terms of the experi-
mental paradigm and delay interval used. Not surpris-
ingly, source information is remembered less well 1 week
after presentation than after only 10 min, in both young
and older adults (McIntyre & Craik, 1987, Experiment 2).
Furthermore, Craik and Kirsner (1974, Experiments 3
and 4) and Marsh and Bower (1993, Experiment 1) both
found that source-monitoring performance deteriorates
significantly within just a few minutes of presentation.
However, neither Marsh and Bower nor Craik and his
colleagues made direct comparisons between source and
item memory, or attempted to draw any conclusions
about the relative effect of delay on both processes.
In contrast, Brown and Halliday (1991) directly com-
pared source and item forgetting, immediately and after
a 1-week delay. Using the paradigm developed by Brown
and Murphy (1989), they had members of a group take
turns generating category exemplars (e.g., different
kinds of fruit); later, each subject classified the exem-
plars on a recognition test (either immediately or 1 week
later) as their own, as others’, or as new responses.
Brown and Halliday were thus able to measure instances
of both source forgetting—defined as “own” responses
called “others’” and “others’” responses called “own”—
and item forgetting, defined as “own” and “others’” re-
sponses called “new.” Based on these indices, both types
of forgetting increased significantly over time, but source
forgetting increased at a faster rate (the ratio of source to
item errors was 2.3:1 at immediate test and 3.2:1 at 1-
week delay). Thus, they conclude that source informa-
tion is forgotten at a faster rate than is item information. 
This conclusion is limited by two factors, both of which
derive from Brown and Halliday’s (1991) choice of par-
adigm. First, the same recognition test was used to mea-
sure both item and source memory, meaning that source
memory can be assessed only if an item is identified as
“old.” Using this technique, source memory may be mea-
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The purpose of the present research was to compare memory for an item with memory for the
item’s source. Experiment 1 investigated discrimination between two external sources: each item in
a list of words was spoken in either a male or a female voice. Subjects received a test of item recog-
nition and a test of source monitoring at each of four delay intervals (immediate, 30 min, 48 h,
1 week). In contrast with previous research, no evidence of differential forgetting rates for item and
source information was found. With delay intervals of 0 and 48 h, Experiment 2 replicated Experi-
ment 1 while adding a reality monitoring condition that required discrimination between an internal
(i.e., self-generated) and an external source. Subjects were better at making internal–external dis-
criminations than at making external–external discriminations, but both types of source monitoring
declined at the same rate as memory for the items themselves.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
1995, 2 (2), 254-259
ITEM AND SOURCE FORGETTING 255
sured for only a subset of items in the original presenta-
tion—that is, those correctly recognized as “old.” Sec-
ond, Brown and Halliday (1991) included only “misses”
in their item-forgetting index; by omitting false posi-
tives—“new” items called “own” or “others’”—this
index may underestimate the true incidence of item for-
getting.
EXPERIMENT 1 
Our f irst experiment was an attempt to replicate
Brown and Halliday’s (1991) findings with a task re-
quiring subjects to distinguish between two external
sources as opposed to making an internal–external dis-
crimination. We solved the problem of using the same
test to measure two dissociable processes by using dif-
ferent stimuli for separate item and source tests in a
within-subject design. The within-subject method allows
for a more sensitive comparison between item and source
memory, especially regarding their relative rate of for-
getting. The delay between stimulus presentation and
test was also manipulated within subjects, using more
levels of delay than had been used in any previous study,
thereby allowing for a finer assessment of the forgetting
function. 
Specifically, subjects were presented a list of words,
each of which was read in either a male or a female voice.
The subjects’ memory for the list items and their memory
for the source of the items were tested immediately and
at delays of 30 min, 48 h, and 1 week. We made three pre-
dictions: (1) Subjects’ ability to recognize that an item
had been on the list would exceed their ability to recog-
nize its source—that is, which voice had spoken the item.
As noted earlier, this is a common finding (e.g., Brown &
Halliday, 1991; Voss et al., 1987) and may derive from the
fact that source monitoring requires, on average, more
differentiated input (Johnson et al., 1993). (2) Both item
recognition and source monitoring would decrease as the
delay increased. Like other aspects of memory, source
monitoring should deteriorate over time (cf. Marsh &
Bower, 1993). (3) The rate of forgetting would be faster
for source information than for item information. We
sought to extend Brown and Halliday’s (1991) finding to
a different source-monitoring situation, with the addi-
tional procedural modifications of a within-subject de-
sign and a larger number of delay intervals.
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 48 Louisiana State University under-
graduates. 
Materials and Design. The stimuli were 160 words chosen randomly
from the Toronto Word Pool (Friendly, Franklin, Hoffman, & Rubin,
1982). The words were divided randomly into two lists of 80 words,
List A and List B. Each list of words was recorded onto a cassette tape
to be played during the study phase of the experiment. Forty randomly
chosen words were spoken in a male voice, and 40 were spoken in a fe-
male voice; the order of the male- and female-voiced words within
each list was random, with the constraint that for each word spoken in
a particular voice in List A, the word in the corresponding ordinal po-
sition in List B be spoken in the same voice. Half of the subjects heard
List A; the other half heard List B. 
The first test was given immediately after the study list; a second test
was given 30 min later, a third was given after 48 h, and a fourth 168 h
(1 week) after the study list. 
Each word from the study list was tested once during the experiment.
Each test phase consisted of 10 item-recognition test stimuli and 10
source-monitoring test stimuli. Each stimulus on the item test com-
prised a word from the study list paired with the word in the corre-
sponding ordinal position from the unstudied list. For example, the
first word on List A was forgive and the first word on List B was
player; thus one of the item-test stimuli was the pair forgive player. Ac-
cordingly, each set of 10 item-test stimuli used 20 words from the total
pool of 160 words, and the four item tests together used 80 words. 
Each item on the source test comprised a single word from the study
list followed by the letters M and F—for example, forgive M F. The
four source tests used 10 words each for a total of 40 words from the
initial pool of 160 words. Together, the item test and the source test ac-
counted for 120 of the 160 stimulus words in the experiment. For each
subject, the remaining 40 words were from the unstudied list that cor-
responded in position to the 40 words used for their source tests. 
A number of counterbalancing measures were taken with the test
lists. First, for half of the subjects, the first 10 items in each of the four
tests were item stimuli and the second 10 were source stimuli. The
order of item and source test stimuli was reversed for the other half of
the subjects. Second, each word was used for an item test for half of
the subjects and for a source test for the other half of the subjects.
Third, the test stimuli were divided into four sets of 20 stimuli, 10 item
and 10 source stimuli. These four sets were rotated through the four test
times (0, 0.5, 48, and 168 h) according to a Latin square. This rotation
ensured that test items were not confounded with test times. Fourth,
and finally, the left/right position of each item-test stimulus was re-
versed for half of the subjects. All of these counterbalancing measures
were combined to yield 16 separate counterbalancing conditions. 
Procedure. For the study phase, the subjects were told that they
would hear a series of words, some in a male voice, some in a female
voice. The subjects were also told that they needed only to remember
which voice spoke each word; they did not expect to be tested on their
memory for the items themselves. To ensure that subjects attended to
the study list, as each word was spoken, they indicated whether they
could generate a mental image of it.1
The list of 80 words was played over loudspeakers at a 5-sec rate.
Immediately after the list was completed, the experimenter gave the in-
structions for both the item test and the source test. During this testing
phase, each subject wore headphones attached to a small tape player
that guided them through the test. The subjects had the written test in
front of them while listening to the auditory version. For each item-test
stimulus, the studied word and the unstudied word were spoken by 
the voice that had originally spoken the studied word, with a 2-sec
pause separating the words. Test stimuli were spoken aloud because 
re-presenting a stimulus auditorily has been found to provide a more
sensitive test of word recognition (Craik & Kirsner, 1974; Palmeri,
Goldinger, & Pisoni, 1993). The words were always spoken in the order
in which the items were presented on the page from left to right. The
subjects circled the word from each pair that they thought was from the
study list. 
For each source-test stimulus, the word from the study list was spo-
ken first in the male voice and then in the female voice, with a 2-sec
pause separating the utterances. The subjects circled either M or F to
indicate that they thought the word was originally spoken in either a
male or female voice. Next, the subjects engaged in an unrelated short-
term memory task until 30 min had elapsed since the end of the study
list. The subjects were then given another item test and another source
test.
Following the second pair of tests, the subjects were sent home.
They returned 2 days later and again 5 days after that. During each of
these sessions, the subjects were given an item test and a source test.
Results and Discussion 
The results are shown in the left-hand panel of Fig-
ure 1. Item performance exceeded source performance
[F(1,47) = 5.32, p = .03], confirming our first prediction.
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Likewise, supporting our second prediction, perfor-
mance declined from the first to the fourth test [F(1,47) =
19.17, p < .001] and planned linear contrasts showed
that there was a significant decline in performance for
both item recognition [F(1,47) = 29.52, p < .001] and
source monitoring [F(1,47) = 36.49, p < .001].
Because of a problem with a floor effect in pilot test-
ing (see Note 1), we compared both item recognition and
source monitoring to what would be expected by chance
(.5) at each of the four delay intervals. Performance reli-
ably exceeded chance at every interval, both for item
recognition and source monitoring [t (47) > 1.9, p < .05,
in every case, by a one-tailed test]. Thus, the subjects ex-
hibited the ability to remember both item and source in-
formation for as long as 1 week after initially studying the
stimuli. 
Our third prediction was that the rate of forgetting for
source monitoring would exceed the rate of forgetting
for item recognition. The simple interaction between
type of test and delay failed to reach statistical signifi-
cance [F(3,141) = 0.35, p = .79]; likewise, a comparison
of the linear trends for item recognition and source mon-
itoring revealed no discernible difference [F(1,47) = 0.91,
p = .34], thereby failing to support the notion that memory
for source information declines faster than item memory.
EXPERIMENT 2 
Our finding that source information was not forgotten
more rapidly than item information contradicts results
reported previously by Brown and Halliday (1991). Our
procedure deviated from theirs in that we used an external
source-monitoring task rather than a reality monitoring
task (Johnson et al., 1993). Reality monitoring involves
determining whether information was self-generated or
had an external source (Johnson & Raye, 1981), as in
Brown and Halliday’s (1991) experimental task, where
subjects attributed information either to themselves or to
another subject. External source monitoring, on the other
hand, requires discriminating among multiple external
sources, as in Experiment 1, where subjects attributed
information to either a male or a female speaker.2
Internally and externally derived memories differ along
a number of dimensions, such as the amount of sensory in-
formation and information about cognitive operations
(Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981). These dif-
ferences lead to the prediction that discriminating between
items belonging to a single class (i.e., internal–internal or
external–external) will be more difficult than discrimi-
nating between classes (Johnson et al., 1993). This pre-
diction has been supported by Raye and Johnson (1980),
who found that subjects were better at discriminating be-
tween an internal and an external source than between
two external sources, an advantage that becomes even
greater in elderly subjects (Hashtroudi et al., 1989). 
Although reality monitoring is superior to external
source monitoring overall, the relative rate of forgetting
for these two types of source monitoring has not yet been
investigated. The same stimulus characteristics which
make reality monitoring easier than external source mon-
itoring might also influence forgetting in the two types of
tasks, thereby accounting for the discrepancy between
the results of Experiment 1 and those obtained by Brown
and Halliday (1991). The ability to distinguish between
sources might be lost more quickly when the distinction
is between an internal and an external source (i.e., real-
ity monitoring) than when it is between two external
sources. Experiment 2 tested the possibility that reality
monitoring would show a faster rate of forgetting than
item memory. It also included an external-source moni-
Figure 1. Probability of item recognition and [external] source monitoring in Ex-
periment 1 (left panel) and of item recognition, external source monitoring, and re-
ality monitoring in Experiment2 (right panel). Error bars represent standard errors.
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toring task, to allow for a replication of Experiment 1
and to provide a direct comparison of the two types of
source-monitoring tasks. 
As in Experiment 1, the experiment consisted of both
a study phase and a test phase. The study phase com-
prised a list of words, each of which was presented in one
of three different ways: auditorily, visually, or as a word
fragment requiring subjects to generate the word. The
test phase was similar to that of Experiment 1 in that sub-
jects made one of several different judgments for each
word on the study list. As in Experiment 1, for some of
the words, subjects were to make an item-recognition
judgment—that is, which of two words (target or distrac-
tor) had been presented during the study phase; for other
words, they were to make an external source-monitoring
judgment—that is, was the word presented visually or
auditorily. In addition, for some of the words, the subjects
were to make a reality-monitoring judgment—that is, was
the word generated as a word fragment or presented ex-
ternally (either visually or auditorily).
Method 
Subjects. The subjects were 66 Louisiana State University under-
graduates who received extra course credit in exchange for their par-
ticipation. 
Materials and Design. The experiment was a 2  3 within-subject
design. There were two test delays, immediate and 48 h, and three
types of test, item recognition (old vs. new), external source monitor-
ing (auditory vs. visual), and reality monitoring (internally vs. exter-
nally generated). 
From each of 24 categories in the Battig and Montague (1969) stim-
ulus set (e.g., color), we selected the eight most typical exemplars, ex-
empting those that comprised two words or that belonged to more than
1 category. For each category, the eight exemplars were divided into
four pairs consisting of the first and second, third and fourth, fifth and
sixth, and seventh and eighth most typical exemplars, respectively. For
each pair, one exemplar was randomly assigned to serve as a target and
one to serve as the distractor for that target in the item-recognition test
(described below). Thus, there were 96 targets and 96 distractors. 
Study phase. Each subject sat at an Apple Macintosh Classic II com-
puter and wore headphones attached to the computer. As in Experi-
ment 1, the subjects were instructed to attend only to source information. 
Each word was presented in one of three different ways: auditorily,
visually, or as a word fragment requiring subjects to generate the re-
sponse. For auditory presentation, each word was digitally recorded in
a male voice and presented through headphones. For visual presenta-
tion, each word was presented in 24-point Geneva font. For presenta-
tion as word fragments, a word fragment was created for each target by
removing all of the even-numbered letters (e.g., blue became b_u_);
however, for exemplars longer than four letters, we retained the second
letter (e.g., yellow became yel_o_), because pilot testing had suggested
that many exemplars become too difficult otherwise. Likewise, extra
letters were retained in a handful of relatively long exemplars. The 96
target words were assigned randomly and evenly to the three presenta-
tion modes, and this randomization was performed separately for each
subject. 
To constrain the responses to the word fragments, a category name
(e.g., colors) appeared on the computer screen 0.5 sec before the word
fragment. For the sake of consistency, a category name preceded audi-
tory and visual presentations as well. When subjects were presented
with a word fragment, they typed their solution to it. If their solution
was correct, the study list continued. If it was incorrect, they were al-
lowed to try another solution. At this point, if there was more than one
missing letter, a randomly chosen letter was replaced. After three un-
successful attempts, the subjects saw a message instructing them to ask
the experimenter for a hint. This happened infrequently (less than once
per subject), and in each case, the experimenter gave the subject a cue
which allowed him or her to complete the fragment (e.g., “rhymes with
‘glue’”). In every case, the subject was eventually able to complete the
fragment. 
When the subjects saw or heard an exemplar, they had to wait at least
3 sec before the computer would accept a keypress that would continue
the study list. Because the study phase was self-paced, the subjects
spent more time and effort, on average, on generating the word frag-
ments than on hearing or seeing the other two types of words. This con-
found is inherent to research using a reality-monitoring paradigm
(Johnson & Raye, 1981) and is minimized by Slamecka and Graf ’s
(1978) finding that the size of the generation effect is roughly the same
for self-paced and experimentally controlled presentation. 
Test phase. When the subjects completed the study list, they were in-
formed about the test phase, which consisted of a series of items pre-
sented one at a time on the computer screen. Each test item consisted
of one of three forced-choice judgments about a word that had been
presented during the study phase: item recognition, reality monitoring,
or external source monitoring. For the item-recognition test, the sub-
jects saw a target and a distractor and selected the item they thought
had been presented in the study phase. For the reality-monitoring test,
the subjects saw a target and selected either “typed by you” (i.e., gen-
erated) or “saw/heard.” For the external source-monitoring test, they
saw a target that had been presented externally and selected either
“saw” or “heard.” 
For each judgment, one alternative was presented on the left of the
screen and the other was presented on the right of the screen. For each
subject, the left–right order was determined randomly and separately
for each item. The subjects had to choose one of the two alternatives
before they could go on to the next test item. The three test types were
mixed together randomly and separately for each subject. The item-
recognition test contained 4 visual, 4 auditory, and 8 generated targets
(plus 16 distractors); the reality-monitoring test contained 4 visual, 4
auditory, and 8 generated targets; and the external source-monitoring
test contained 8 auditory and 8 visual targets. 
After responding to all of the test items, the subjects were sent home.
They returned 48 h later and took the second test, which was procedu-
rally identical to the first. Within each test type, half of the target items
were tested immediately and half were tested after 48 h. Thus, there
were 48 test items at each delay, 16 for each type of test. The assign-
ment of each target to immediate or 48-h testing was determined ran-
domly for each subject. Furthermore, within the immediate and 48-h
testing conditions, the order of the exemplars was also random and sep-
arate for each subject.
Results and Discussion 
The results are illustrated in the right-hand panel of Fig-
ure 1.3 There was a main effect of type of test [F(2,130) =
84.08, p < .001]. As in Experiment 1, item-recognition per-
formance reliably exceeded external source-monitoring
performance [F(1,130) = 151.17, p < .001], and, repli-
cating Raye and Johnson (1980), reality-monitoring per-
formance reliably exceeded external source-monitoring
performance as well [F(1,130) = 94.43, p < .001]. Fi-
nally, as found by Brown and Halliday (1991), item-
recognition performance reliably exceeded reality-mon-
itoring performance [F(1,130) = 6.65, p = .01]. 
There was also a main effect of delay [F(1,65) =
155.31, p < .001], and planned comparisons revealed a
statistically significant decline in performance for the
item-recognition test, the reality-monitoring test, and the
external source-monitoring test [F(1,65) = 42.88, 56.92,
and 56.92, respectively; p < .001 in each case]. 
Of primary concern, however, is the interaction be-
tween type of test and delay. The overall interaction was
not statisically significant [F(2,130) = 0.33, p = .72].
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Planned comparisons testing for an interaction between
delay and each pair of tests were also conducted. As in
Experiment 1, the effect of delay did not interact with
type of test for item recognition and external source mon-
itoring [F(1,130) = 0.50, p = .48]. The reality-monitoring
test also failed to show a steeper rate of forgetting than
the item-recognition test [F(1,130) = 0.50, p = .48]. Fi-
nally, the difference in rate of forgetting between the ex-
ternal source-monitoring and reality-monitoring condi-
tions was also nonsignificant [F(1,130) < 0.01]. Thus,
there is no evidence that source information is forgotten
faster than item information, regardless of whether the
source information involves a discrimination between
two external sources or between an internal and an ex-
ternal source.
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
As previous research has demonstrated (e.g., Brown & Halliday,
1991; Voss et al., 1987), subjects recognize whether or not an item was
previously encountered in an experimental situation better than they
recognize the source of that item. Item recognition is superior whether
the source monitoring involves discrimination between an internal and
an external source or between two external sources. As suggested by
Johnson et al. (1993), any type of source monitoring might require, on av-
erage, more differentiated input than item recognition. This general re-
quirement would produce a tendency toward inferior source-monitoring
performance. Even when subjects were instructed to attend only to source
information and the original voice was re-presented during test in order
to improve their source monitoring (Experiment 1), their item recog-
nition was still consistently superior. Of the two types of source mon-
itoring, subjects performed better on the reality-monitoring task (Ex-
periment 2), supporting Johnson and Raye’s (1981; Raye & Johnson,
1980) theory regarding the general differences between internally and
externally derived memories.
One of the most robust findings in all memory research is that mem-
ory diminishes over time, and source memory is no different in this re-
spect. Our results are consistent with previous findings (Brown & Hal-
liday, 1991; Craik & Kirsner, 1974; Marsh & Bower, 1993) showing
that source monitoring, like other aspects of memory, deteriorates over
time. If source memory begins at a sufficiently high level, incremental
forgetting of source information continues for periods as long as 1
week; nevertheless, after 1 week, source monitoring is still better than
chance.
In contrast to previous findings (Brown & Halliday, 1991), we ob-
tained no evidence that memory for an item’s source—in terms of ei-
ther reality monitoring or external source monitoring—declines more
rapidly than memory for the item itself. Our method differs from
Brown and Halliday’s in that we used a within-subject, rather than a be-
tween-subjects, design. The within-subject design was chosen in order
to use different stimuli for separate item and source tests, thereby over-
coming the problem of using the same test to measure both processes
(i.e., “given that the information is correctly recognized as ‘old,’ what
is its source?”). In using the same test to measure both item and source
forgetting, Brown and Halliday did not consider false positives (i.e.,
“new” items called “own” or “others’”) to be evidence of item forget-
ting, even though these errors show just as much inability to distin-
guish between old and new items as does mislabeling an old item as
“new.” Thus, the true incidence of item forgetting is potentially higher
than their index indicates. Using this modified testing procedure, we
obtained equivalent forgetting rates for item recognition, external
source monitoring, and reality monitoring.4
In summary, we replicated previous research in finding that item in-
formation is remembered better than source information, whether the
source monitoring involves discriminating between two external
sources or between an internal and an external source. Of the two types
of source monitoring, subjects are better at making internal–external
distinctions. Also consistent with previous research, performance on
all three tasks declines over time. However, we obtained no evidence
that memory for an item’s source declines more rapidly than memory
for the item itself. 
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NOTES
1. These instructions were chosen on the basis of pilot testing. If sub-
jects were instructed to remember both the words and the voice in which
each word was spoken, their performance on the source test did not dif-
fer from chance after just a 30-min delay. Although the instructions
confound the source–item comparison with intentionality, research has
shown that incidental learning is roughly equivalent to intentional learn-
ing given a relatively “deep” orienting task (e.g., Hyde & Jenkins,
1969), such as the imagery instruction used in Experiment 1.
2. This distinction between reality monitoring and external source
monitoring roughly follows the framework proposed by Johnson et al.
(1993), who go on to distinguish two different forms of reality moni-
toring: (1) reality monitoring, per se, which compares internal (per-
formed or imagined) and external (perceived) events, and (2) discrim-
inating between what one merely thought (imagined) and what one
actually said or did (performed), labeled “internal source monitoring.”
The two subtypes are alike, and distinguished from external source
monitoring, in their inclusion of the self as a potential source of infor-
mation. For the purposes of this paper, “reality monitoring” refers to
the former type—that is, making an internal–external distinction.
3. Subjects appear to have done considerably better on the item-
recognition test in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. This can be at-
tributed to the inclusion in Experiment 2 of the word-fragment condi-
tion, which would produce a generation effect in remembering which
stimuli had been on the study list (Slamecka & Graf, 1978).
4. In comparing forgetting rates, we have employed what Slamecka
(1985) has referred to as the “customary” procedure. It must be ac-
knowledged that there are other means of measuring forgetting (e.g.,
Loftus, 1985); however, these alternative methods require the a priori
adoption of a particular model of forgetting. Following Slamecka
(1985; see also Wixted, 1990), we have taken a primarily functional ap-
proach to the issue of forgetting rates.
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